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Two Types of Autonomy
J. S. Swindell, Baylor College of Medicine
Although I agree with Sabine Mu¨ller’s (2009) conclusion
that we should first seek to find alternatives to amputation
for patients suffering from Body Integrity Identity Disor-
der (BIID), I disagree with one of the major premises that
she uses to argue for her claim. Mu¨ller argues that patients
with BIID are likely not autonomous when they request that
the limb be amputated. Mu¨ller’s argument that BIID suffers
are not autonomous is flawed because she conflates philo-
sophical conceptions of autonomy with the conception of
autonomy that is operative in the context of medicine.
Mu¨ller (2009) argues that autonomous action requires
intention, insight, and absence of externally controlling
or coercive influences; and she goes on to argue that au-
tonomous action requires free will, which (drawing on Kant)
is the will that is determined by an agent’s “rational” judg-
ment, or at least (drawing on Frankfurt) is the will that
the agent in some sense approves of upon reflection. She
then argues that BIID patients do not have a free will when
they request amputation because their thinking is obsessive.
The philosophical notions of autonomy that Mu¨ller employs
(e.g. Kant and Frankfurt) are quite different from the con-
ception of autonomy that is operative in medicine.
The conception of autonomy that is operative in
medicine serves the function of warding off unjustified pa-
ternalism. In the context of medicine, the concept of auton-
omy is seen as a patient’s right to make decisions among
medically reasonable alternatives so long as the patient is
able to 1) understand the condition and the risks and ben-
efits of the proposed treatment plan; 2) appreciate that the
relevant prognosis and risks apply to her; 3) engage in a
process of reasoning and weighing the pros and cons; and
4) arrive at a decision and communicate that to the medi-
cal team. Various instruments have been developed (most
notably the MacArthur Test for Competence to Consent to
Treatment (MACCAT-T)) to formally measure these abili-
ties, which are clinically labeled “decision making capaci-
ties” (Grisso and Appelbaum 1998).
The concept of autonomy that is operative in philoso-
phy is much different. In the philosophical context, auton-
omy is an ideal for persons to aim for that involves a certain
relationship among their internal states (e.g. that their mo-
tivations are ones that they in some sense endorse). There
are various philosophical conceptions of what sort of inter-
nal relationships (among desires, motivations, beliefs, rea-
sons, etc.) are required for autonomous choice and action.
For example, Harry Frankfurt (1998) argues that what is
required is that the agent “identify” with the motivating de-
sire; Michael Bratman argues that what is required is that
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the agent view the motivating desire as “reason-giving” in
light of the normative content of the agent’s self-governing
policies; and John Chrisman argues that what is required
is that the agent be satisfied with the process that led to
the motivating desire becoming a motivating desire (Taylor
2005). Needless to say, philosophical notions of autonomy
are complex, and they are very different from the notion of
autonomy that is used in medicine.
The distinction between these two types of autonomy
is important, for it is not as if we do or should force pa-
tients to act on only their rational or endorsed preferences.
Nowhere else in society do we force persons to act only on
their endorsed decisions. Imagine the case of a dieter who
has a desire to eat a piece of cake, and decides to eat the cake
even though upon reflection he does not want his desire to
eat the cake to move him to action—he is just being weak of
will. Society does not stop this man from eating the cake in
an attempt to force him to act autonomously (i.e. in accord
with his endorsed desires). Even in cases of more serious
consequence (although obesity of course has serious con-
sequences), we do not force persons to act autonomously
in the philosophical sense of autonomy. Imagine a case of
a person who has a desire to have unprotected sex with
an HIV+ person every night, and decides to do that even
though upon reflection he does not want to be moved by his
desire for sex because he knows that there is a chance that he
will contract HIV. While society may have a responsibility
to make sure that this man is properly informed about the
risks, society has no right to interfere and force this man to
act autonomously (i.e. in accord with his endorsed desires).
Not only would it be ethically problematic to force pa-
tients to behave autonomously in the philosophical sense,
it would be practically impossible as well. It is not as if we
ever could ensure that patients have a certain relationship
among their internal states (e.g. endorsement of their first
order desires, or as Frankfurt calls it, wholehearted iden-
tification with one’s first order desires) when they inform
us of their medical choices. Frankfurt himself has admitted
that in his autonomy theorizing, he is interested in meta-
physics and not practical ethical questions. He says, “If this
were a question of public policy, if we were trying to de-
cide how to conduct our judicial system or our system of
rewards and punishments, it would not be terribly useful to
talk about wholeheartedness. . . ” (Frankfurt 1998, 39). And
this is because we can never really know whether a person
wholeheartedly identifies with the factors that motivate her
choice, for we cannot get inside another person’s head, so
to speak.




































Body Integrity Identity Disorder (BIID)
So, it may be the case that our BIID sufferer is not making
an autonomous choice (in the philosophical sense) when she
requests amputation, but all that is needed for her choice to
be respected in the medical context is 1) that she is informed
and has decision making capacity; and 2) that her choice
is among the medically reasonable alternatives. Hence, two
lines of argument against amputation in BIID that might
be pursued are 1) that the BIID patient lacks the ability
to understand, appreciate, deliberate, or communicate (i.e.
lacks decision making capacity); or (2) that amputation is
not a medically reasonable alternative. Either line of argu-
ment against amputation in BIID should be evidence based.
In other words, in order to argue that BIID patients lack
decision-making capacity, formal assessments of capacity
should be performed by psychiatrists with the assistance of
tools such as the MACCAT-T. Similarly, arguments against
amputation in BIID that are based on the premise that am-
putation is not a medically reasonable alternative should
also be evidence based. That is not to say that values such
as patient beneficence will not play a role in that argument,
for surely they will; but arguers should take care to make
sure that claims about the benefit that would or would not
occur from amputation be evidence based. In sum, there are
arguments to be made against amputation in BIID (e.g. un-
certainty about the benefits of amputation and uncertainty
about the availability of less harmful alternatives), but that
the sufferers are not autonomous in the Kantian or Frank-
furtian sense is not one of them. 
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The Relevance of Identity
in Responding to BIID and the Misuse
of Causal Explanation
Avi Craimer, Georgetown University
The primary reason cited for wanting amputation of healthy
limbs is that “the amputation would correct a mismatch be-
tween the person’s anatomy and sense of his or her ‘true’
self” (First 2005, 922). In his study of 52 people with the de-
sire for amputation, First found that 63% cited the realization
of their identity as the primary reason for wanting the am-
putation, while 73% reported identity realization as either a
primary or secondary reason. It is surprising, therefore, that
Mu¨ller (2009) almost entirely neglects the significance of the
question of identity in her discussion of the ethics of offering
surgical amputation to treat Body Integrity Identity Disor-
der (BIID). She writes, “the definition of BIID as an identity
disorder in analogy to the gender identity disorder is only a
descriptive classification but no explanation” (36). It is clear
from the context that by “explanation,” Mu¨ller means scien-
tific causal explanation, which she means to contrast with
Address correspondence to Avi Craimer, Georgetown University. E-mail: adc34@georgetown.edu
1. In this commentary, I use the terms self and identity interchangeably to denote those personal characteristics which define who a person
is, in a practically significant sense (Schetchman 1996).
a clinical description of the characteristics of the condition.
Mu¨ller goes on to make a second claim that “[t]he conse-
quence of the controversy about the causes of BIID is a con-
troversy about its therapy” (36)—in other words, Mu¨ller
thinks that the ethical debate over the appropriateness of
surgical amputations as a treatment for BIID stems from a
lack of scientific clarity about the etiology of the condition.
Mu¨ller (2009) is mistaken on both of these counts. In
drawing a dichotomy between clinical description and sci-
entific explanation, Mu¨ller leaves out the question of how
our conception of a condition as an identity disorder re-
lates to our normative understanding of that condition. The
characterization of BIID as an identity disorder is not only a
matter of clinical description but of characterizing the desire
for amputation as a part of the patient’s identity or self.1 The
ethical controversy over the treatment of BIID stems at least
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